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Three  propositions  have  become  conventional  wisdom  in 
Washington  and  elsewhere.  Americans  save  too  little.  As  a 
consequence, the US current account deficit is unsustainably large. 
A necessary step to bring the global economy into sustainable 
balance  is  a  significant  appreciation  of  the  Chinese  currency, 
which in practice has been fixed to the dollar for over a decade.
All  these  separate  but  related  propositions  are  highly 
questionable. This policy brief addresses each in turn. It suggests 
that Americans save quite enough for future generations, that the 
startlingly large US current account deficit is not only sustainable 
but a natural feature of today’s highly globalized economy, and 
that a revaluation of the Chinese currency, far from alleviating 
global imbalances, would run the risk of precipitating a financial 
crisis. These claims are not meant to suggest there are no problems 
with the current state of affairs. Rather, this brief suggests that 
events need to be interpreted in light of the evolution of the US 
and world economies in recent years and that this interpretation 
will put the global imbalances in a different perspective.
As a starting point, recall from GDP accounting that every 
country’s  current  account  position  must  satisfy  the  following 
equation:
M – X = I – S – (T – G)
In words, a current account deficit—the excess of a country’s 
imports (M) of goods, services, investment earnings, and transfers 
from the rest of the world over its exports (X) of these categories 
to  the  rest  of  the  world—must  equal  the  difference  between 
investment  (I)  in  the  country  and  its  national  savings,  where 
national savings is the sum of private saving (S) and public saving 
(T–G)—the excess of government revenue (T) over government 
expenditure (G). It follows from this accounting identity, which 
apart from measurement errors must always be satisfied, that a 
current account deficit can be reduced through some combination 
of reduced investment and increased private and public saving. 
By the same token, a current account surplus can be reduced only 
through an increase in investment and/or a reduction in saving.
The above equation as applied to the United States for 2004 
looks like the following, where all components are entered as a 
percentage of GDP that year:
5.6 = 19.6 – 15.0 + 1.6 – 0.6
The final –0.6 is the measurement error in the US national 
accounts. The current account deficit was 5.6 percent of GDP, a 
level that many observers considered unsustainably large. Gross 
investment—including investment in housing, which accounted 
for  about  one-third  of  the  total,  and  modest  investment  by 
governments—accounted  for  nearly  20  percent  of  GDP, 
significantly up from the recession lows of 2001–02 but low by 
international standards.
Saving in the United StateS 
Private  saving  of  15  percent  includes  not  just  the  often-cited 
household saving, below 2 percent of personal income, but also 
corporate saving. Both investment and saving include allowance 
for depreciation of physical assets, as is appropriate in an economy 
experiencing  rapid  technological  change,  since  “replacement” 
of  worn-out  capital  typically  involves  significant  technological 
improvement, not simple replacement of old machinery. Moreover, 
in well-managed firms, all major new investment expenditures 
(as  distinguished  from  maintenance  of  existing  structures  and 
equipment), even those financed from depreciation allowances, 
are properly evaluated as new investments, to be undertaken only 
if they meet the firm’s target rate of return. Thus in today’s world, 
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savings and investment should appropriately be measured in 
gross rather than net terms, even apart from the measurement 
problems  associated  with  depreciating  capital  in  economic 
terms. 
However, this measurement of saving takes the national 
accounts as they come. They were formulated in Britain and the 
United States in the 1930s, at the height of the industrial age. 
In an information- or knowledge-based economy, one needs 
to take a broader view of saving. Economists define saving as 
income that is deferred from consumption today for the purpose 
of achieving higher consumption in the future. The national 
accounts focus on productive physical capital plus housing. A 
broader and more appropriate concept must add at least three 
components of current output: consumer durables, education, 
and  expenditure  on  research  and  development  (R&D). 
Purchase of consumer durables and expenditure on education 
are considered “consumption” in the national accounts. Yet a 
new refrigerator may last 25 years, and the typical automobile 
lasts over 10 years. Education is known to have a high rate of 
return. Education draws significant private expenditure as well 
as expenditure on the public school systems and universities. 
These items are purchased at least in part because they augment 
future income and consumption and to that extent should be 
considered savings and investment. R&D does not enter the 
national accounts at all (except when performed by government, 
entered in G) but rather is considered an intermediate business 
expense.  Yet,  studies  suggest  that  R&D  on  average  has  a 
high  payoff  in  the  future,  much  higher  than  most  physical 
investment. 
In the United States, these three categories of expenditure 
taken together have amounted to about 19 percent of GDP in 
recent years—8.6 percent for consumer durables, 7.3 percent 
for education, and 2.8 percent for R&D. When added to the 15 
percent from the national accounts, Americans save a third of 
GDP, properly measured. Furthermore, Americans in general 
have confidence in their future (despite efforts by the George 
W. Bush administration to scare them into believing the public 
pension system, Social Security, is in deep trouble). In particular, 
they are confident, thanks to continuing technological change, 
that  their  grandchildren  will  be  materially  much  better  off  
than they are, just as they are materially much better off than 
their grandparents were. It is not surprising, then, that diverse 
government measures to increase private savings over the years 
have  shown  meager  success:  Americans  are  aware  that  they 
save quite enough. (This macroeconomic discussion of course 
concerns  national  averages.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  many 
families save too little for their own interests, and if they did 
so, private savings might increase; but by the same token, some 
families save more than they will ever possibly need.)
Moreover, a given amount of saving has resulted in greater 
real investment in recent years as the price of capital goods 
has  fallen,  by  7  percent  since  1995  for  total  nonresidential 
investment (by 21 percent relative to the GDP deflator) and by 
18 percent for equipment. 
From an individual’s point of view, although not from 
a social perspective, increases in the relative prices of houses 
represent  effective  saving,  particularly  with  a  capital  market 
that permits mobilization of home values in retirement—for 
example, through reverse mortgages. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the market valuations of 
most US companies exceed, sometimes by a factor of six or 
seven, the book value of tangible assets (less liabilities) in the 
company balance sheet—a reflection of the fact that the market 
sensibly values the intangible assets of the firms more highly 
than the tangible assets. The growth dynamic in a knowledge-
based economy comes from teams of people creating new goods 
and services, not from the accumulation of physical capital.
The corrections to saving suggested above of course apply to 
all countries, not just to the United States. But their contribution 
to total savings is higher in the United States than in most other 
countries, except perhaps for a few Nordic countries.
If private saving cannot be increased, what about public 
saving? The United States ran substantial budget surpluses in the 
late 1990s. At the federal level, these became deficits with the 
recession of 2001–02, the stock market collapse, and the Bush 
tax reductions of 2001 and 2003. State and local governments 
normally  run  surpluses,  thanks  to  contributions  to  pension 
funds for public employees, although they ran small deficits 
in the postrecession years 2002–03. The federal deficit came 
to 3.6 percent of GDP during 2004. It is projected to decline 
slowly in the coming years, provided government expenditure 
is not allowed to expand unduly and the temporary tax cuts 
of 2001 and 2003 are not made permanent, as President Bush 
has proposed. So there is at least a prospect for some decline 
in  public  dissaving,  and  this  could  be  accelerated  through 
deliberate fiscal action. As discussed below, there is good reason 
to reduce the federal budget deficit apart from the contribution 
it would make to increase national saving.
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the CUrrent aCCoUnt defiCit
The US current account deficit reached an extraordinary $660 
billion in 2004, up from $531 billion in 2003 and $474 billion 
in 2002. This deficit has become a dominant feature of the 
world economy. Many contend that it is unsustainable, that it 
must come down, and that if it is not brought down carefully 
and deliberately, it will precipitate a financial collapse of the 
dollar and probably a world recession. Most analysts focus, as 
above, on the linkages of the deficit to the US economy, and 
on the need to raise national savings, or alternatively (but not 
equivalently) on the need for a substantial depreciation of the 
dollar against other leading currencies. 
Here, in contrast, I will focus on the perspective of the 
rest of the world. The counterpart of the US deficit is surpluses 
elsewhere.  Indeed,  apart  from  measurement  error,  the  US 
current account deficit should equal the sum of current account 
positions in the rest of the world. (In fact, there is measurement 
error such that the sum of the world’s deficits exceeds the sum 
of the world’s surpluses, with the difference amounting to over 
$100 billion, 1 to 2 percent of world trade.) It will not be 
possible to reduce the US deficit without reducing surpluses, or 
increasing deficits, elsewhere in the world. Many countries are 
currently running surpluses, although some others—Australia, 
Britain, New Zealand, and Spain among the rich countries—
run significant deficits like the United States. Rich countries 
with  the  largest  surpluses  are  Japan,  Germany,  Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Singapore plus Russia, China, and 
the  members  of  the  Organization  of  Petroleum-Exporting 
Countries  (OPEC),  thanks  to  high  oil  prices  during  2004. 
The  surpluses  of  Japan  and  Germany  alone  equaled  nearly 
half the US deficit and exceeded half if Switzerland and the 
Netherlands, two economies closely linked to Germany, are 
included. I presume OPEC surpluses will decline sharply over 
the next few years as a result of some combination of lower oil 
prices and higher OPEC imports.
Germany and Japan are rapidly aging, high-saving societies 
with limited domestic investment. Personal saving rates have 
declined in Japan, but saving in the corporate sector remains 
high. What has fallen in Japan is investment, which remains 
low even after a revival in 2004.
A big absorber of capital in rich countries is the residential 
sector. Investing in housing does not look attractive in rapidly 
aging societies, with low birth rates and low new household 
formation. If anything, Germany and Japan have a surplus of 
housing in the aggregate, although it may not all be in quite 
the right places. Housing construction is down essentially to 
replacement  plus  a  little  to  allow  for  mobility.  Meanwhile, 
rates of return on industrial investment are low and, of course, 
sensitive  to  what  is  happening  in  the  export  and  import-
competing sectors.
For reasons having to do with their defeat in World War 
II, a key question for Germans and Japanese was how to rebuild 
their  national  self-esteem.  Both  countries  built  it  on  export 
performance, and the technological achievements reflected in 
export performance. That legacy continues five decades later. 
Export performance heavily influences the national psyche in 
both Germany and Japan. If exports are not doing well, people 
feel badly about the economy and society. That in turn influences 
their saving behavior. If the economy is not performing well, 
precautionary saving rises in these now rich countries.
Given the aging of their society, Japanese saving should 
decline and eventually become negative. That may be so, but it 
has been a much slower process than advocates of the life cycle 
hypothesis forecast 20 years ago. Saving remains remarkably 
high in both countries given their demographic structure.
This  syndrome,  in  which  German  and  Japanese  saving 
is  sensitive  to  perceived  economic  performance,  which  in 
turn  is  sensitive  to  export  performance,  is  important  when 
it comes to correcting the US current account deficit. If the 
dollar declines significantly, as many analysts suggest it must, 
leading to significant declines in the export competitiveness of 
key surplus countries, we are likely to see an increase, not a 
reduction, in the propensity to save in those countries, as well as 
a decline in investment. Whether an increase in the propensity 
to save gets translated into actual additional savings depends, of 
course, on what happens to output and income. The conditions 
just described are those under which a recession in economic 
activity could occur. An increase in the propensity to save with 
no obvious vehicle for that savings leads to a fall in output 
and income. US exports to those countries may fall instead of 
rising.
In textbooks, the adjustment mechanism in this process is 
the interest rate, which is assumed to reconcile ex ante differences 
in saving and investment. But real long-term interest rates have 
been low in Japan and Germany for several years. Given their 
demographics, what sort of investment will be stimulated by 
lower interest rates in the presence or even with the prospect 
of  a  significantly  stronger  yen  and  euro?  The  sector  most 
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responsive to interest rates in rich economies generally is the 
housing sector, not industrial investment. Firms will not invest 
in increased productive capacity if they see poor sales prospects, 
no matter how low the interest rate. Yet for the demographic 
reasons already noted, demand for housing will also be limited, 
even at low long-term interest rates.
Hence  I  do  not  see  interest  rates  as  being  an  effective 
adjuster  here.  With  a  large  appreciation  of  these  surplus 
countries’ currencies, the adjuster is more likely to be economic 
activity. It will decline, except insofar as the authorities become 
so concerned about it that the Europeans break all the rules 
they have imposed on themselves, through the Stability Pact’s 
constraints on fiscal policy and the European Central Bank’s 
primary  focus  on  price  stability,  and  pursue  an  aggressive 
stimulative policy.
Thus, there are serious obstacles to significant adjustment 
in current account imbalances in both Europe and Japan. Both 
already have large budget deficits: Japan’s deficit is roughly 7 
percent of GDP, and France, Germany, and Italy, the core 
of the European economy, have fiscal deficits exceeding the 3 
percent limit under the Stability Pact.
Excess saving in these big rich countries manifests itself in 
budget deficits and current account surpluses. Savers directly 
or indirectly buy claims on their governments or on foreigners. 
Further reductions in the long-term interest rate are not likely to 
produce enough domestic investment to substitute for those two 
channels, particularly in the face of a decline in competitiveness 
brought about through large appreciations of their currencies.
Japan and Germany are perhaps unusual because of their 
peculiar histories, with their real and psychological dependence 
on export performance. But it is entirely unclear how currency 
appreciations  will  produce  the  large  changes  in  saving  and 
investment required to eliminate, or even greatly reduce, the 
current account surpluses of rich Asia and Europe. They may 
even produce the opposite effect.
Much of the excess saving in the rest of the world comes to 
the United States; it exceeds investment abroad by Americans 
and accounts for the large current account deficit of the United 
States. Why does this saving come to the United States rather 
than  going  to  emerging  markets,  where  returns  should  be 
expected to be higher? The answer is complex. Some of it of 
course does go to emerging markets, but those countries at 
present, as a group, also have excess saving. Since the financial 
crises of the 1990s, risk-averse investors, especially in Japan and 
Europe, have been reluctant to invest significantly in emerging 
markets outside central Europe, which has largely joined the 
European Union, plus China. Returns in emerging markets are 
not only volatile but on the basis of recent experience in Russia 
and Argentina, may be insecure from political or legal action as 
well. Also, some emerging markets, notably China, have high 
domestic saving rates themselves, more than enough to cover 
their requirements for domestic investment.
The United States in contrast has investment opportunities 
that produce higher yields than Japan and Europe and that are 
less volatile and more secure than investments in many emerging 
markets. Moreover, the US economy is large, accounting for 
a quarter to a third of the world economy (depending on the 
exchange rate used for adding up GDPs in national currencies 
around the world), and has especially well-developed financial 
markets, accounting for half of the world’s marketable securities. 
It is not surprising, then, that funds from all around the world 
are invested in the United States, as well as in Australia, Britain, 
and Canada, which while much smaller than the United States 
share some of its other desirable characteristics and are also 
destinations for much foreign capital.
Gross world savings outside the United States runs around 
$8 trillion, rising from year to year. In a world with increasingly 
globalized financial markets, it would not be surprising for savers 
to desire to place 10 or even 15 percent of their savings into the 
United States, given the characteristics noted above. (Allowance 
for depreciation no doubt creates a home bias, but as noted 
above, well-managed firms evaluate all significant investment 
proposals afresh, even those to be financed from depreciation 
allowances.) Yet 10 percent of this saving would amount to 
$800 billion, exceeding the US current account deficit in 2004. 
Indeed, in that year, an estimated $1.1 trillion of foreign private 
capital came into the United States. Of course, Americans also 
invest abroad, and any inflows must cover those outflows as 
well. Still, these numbers suggest that a large US current account 
deficit could continue for a long time, so long as the American 
economy is producing attractive financial assets.
When private foreign investment slackens, as it did after 
2001, foreign official investment often takes up the slack. There 
has been a huge build-up of foreign exchange reserves in 2003–
04, especially in East Asia but also elsewhere, such as India 
and Russia, as a by-product of macroeconomic and exchange 
rate policies in those countries. Budget deficits have reached 
practical limits in Japan and at least in principle are constrained 
by the Stability Pact in Germany (and France and Italy). China 
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has been overheated and requires some fiscal tightening, despite 
large infrastructure needs. That would tend to increase China’s 
already high saving rate, not reduce it. Private savers in Japan 
are highly risk averse. The Bank of Japan (acting on behalf of 
the Ministry of Finance) is in effect providing foreign exchange 
cover  for  private-sector  savings,  which  from  households 
continue to go heavily into the low-yield postal savings system. 
Japan’s overseas investments can produce a real return to the 
Japanese in the future that increased Japanese budget deficits 
will not. Japan’s reserves are now so large that it should consider 
separating  some  of  them  into  an  investment  account,  as 
Singapore, Norway, and several OPEC members have done, to 
be invested abroad in less liquid but higher-yield securities. In 
China, residents cannot legally invest abroad without specific 
authorization. Again, official investment abroad by the People’s 
Bank of China occurs when private investment cannot take 
place. But the latent demand among China’s newly well-to-do 
citizens for overseas investment, especially in the United States, 
is undoubtedly high.
These are consequences of financial globalization. Capital 
inflows into the US economy are said to be “financing” the US 
current account deficit. That is true only in an accounting sense. 
The motivation, certainly for private flows, more controversially 
for official flows, is investment in the United States. Americans 
have accommodated this excess saving abroad by importing 
much more than they export—“living beyond their means.” 
Although  eventually  the  savings  of  Japan  and  Europe  will 
probably fall, as those societies increasingly age, the current 
configuration can endure for many years. 
These flows are mutually beneficial so long as the United 
States  generates  productive  assets  for  sale  to  foreigners,  in 
financial forms that yield less than the underlying investment 
yields. The US economy intermediates between foreign financial 
investment and US real investment, properly measured. The 
problem  at  present  is  that  the  United  States  is  producing 
high-quality financial claims in abundance, in the form of US 
Treasury securities, that are attractive to foreign institutions 
but that do not support an increase in the productive assets 
of the United States—apart perhaps from federally financed 
R&D. They thus represent a claim on the unaugmented future 
income of Americans. If the United States wants to reduce these 
claims, increase national saving, and encourage greater private 
investment, it needs to take serious steps—more serious than 
simply  proposing  cuts  in  expenditure  programs  with  strong 
congressional and public support—to reduce the federal budget 
deficit.
The  current  account  deficit  represents  net  foreign 
purchases of assets in the United States. While the deficit may 
be sustainable from the perspective of the rest of the world, 
according to the reasoning above, is it sustainable in the United 
States, or will foreigners eventually end up owning all the assets 
in the United States?
Play the following thought experiment: The US current 
account deficit continues indefinitely at $600 billion, while the 
US economy grows indefinitely at 5 percent in nominal terms. 
On official data at the end of 2003, foreigners had total claims 
on the US economy of $2.4 trillion, net of American claims on 
the rest of the world. Given this initial condition, what are the 
implications over time of our two assumptions? The ratio of net 
foreign claims to US GDP—a ratio many economists look at in 
assessing sustainability—will rise for some years, but it reaches 
a peak of 50 percent in 15 years (up from 22 percent in 2003), 
and then will fall indefinitely thereafter.
Foreigners will then own more of the US capital stock—
around a fifth, net of US claims abroad, if all the ownership 
were direct. But the United States has several layers of financial 
assets above the capital stock, financial assets that foreigners 
typically buy—by now over three times the capital stock and 
still growing—so foreigners would own under 10 percent of US 
financial assets. The yield on these assets would represent claims 
on US output, reducing the income of Americans relative to 
what it would be if Americans owned all the assets, but almost 
certainly leaving American incomes higher than they would 
have been had the rest of the world made fewer investments in 
the US economy, since the US capital stock would be lower.
The current account deficit, while by assumption constant 
in dollar terms, will fall steadily as a share of constantly growing 
GDP, reaching 2.5 percent in 2019, the year in which the 
foreign claims to GDP ratio reaches its peak, and falling further 
thereafter. Foreign earnings on their US investments would 
grow over time, so the trade balance must improve in order to 
maintain a constant current account deficit. This scenario may 
not come to pass, but it does not look unsustainable.
The test is somewhat more severe if the ratio of the current 
account deficit to GDP remains constant at, say, 5 percent, but 
that scenario also does not explode into unsustainability.
However, the deficit cannot of course continue to grow 
indefinitely as a share of GDP. Careful analysts correctly point 
to the unsustainability of the trajectory of the deficit that they 
have observed in the recent past and that they project into the 
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future. While the deficit can continue to rise as a percentage of 
GDP for a while, sooner or later that rise must halt. That valid 
proposition is an altogether different claim from one that the 
deficit, even a large deficit, is unsustainable.
A  constant  or  constant  share  deficit  may  require  some 
depreciation of the dollar. Foreign earnings on their growing US 
claims will also grow, and the trade deficit may have to decline 
to accommodate this (the extent depends on the yield on net 
foreign claims). The depreciation, in turn, will slow the growth 
of net foreign claims on the United States, not only by reducing 
the trade deficit but also by increasing the dollar value of US 
claims on foreigners, the so-called valuation effect, arising from 
the fact that most US claims on foreigners are denominated in 
foreign currency, whereas most foreign claims on the United 
States are denominated in US dollars. Thus in 2003, a year of 
dollar depreciation against the euro and the yen, the negative 
net foreign asset position of the United States declined by $80 
billion despite a current account deficit over $500 billion.
In  time,  national  savings  will  decline  in  aging  societies 
such as Japan and Europe. And their institutional investors will 
regain confidence in emerging markets. Thus we can expect 
some decline in the surpluses of the rest of the world. But that 
process will take some years.
In summary, a large current account deficit for the United 
States is likely to continue for some years, a natural consequence 
of excess saving in the rest of the world, an attractive menu 
of financial assets from which to choose in the United States, 
and increasing globalization of financial markets. The United 
States has a revealed comparative advantage in producing highly 
attractive financial claims, to the mutual benefit of foreigners 
and American alike so long as Americans invest the proceeds 
productively. This is not to argue that there will be no financial 
crisis  focused  on  sharp  depreciation  of  the  dollar,  as  some 
analysts fear, but it is to argue that such a crisis is far from 
inevitable and indeed that it will not arise from a large deficit 
per se. In particular, it would be a mistake to try to eliminate 
the current account deficit in the near future or even to try to 
reduce it to $200 billion to $300 billion, as some analysts have 
proposed.
China and the renminbi
China  has  experienced  an  enormous  increase  in  foreign 
exchange reserves during the past several years, reaching $711 
billion in mid-2005, second only after Japan. In 2004, $200 
billion was added, and another $100 billion was added in the 
first half of 2005. The rise in reserves has occurred as a direct 
consequence of China’s exchange rate policy of holding the 
value of the renminbi, the Chinese currency, at 8.28 renminbi 
per US dollar. China has run a modest trade surplus since 1990 
(except for 1993), which reached a peak of $44 billion in 1998, 
registering $33 billion for 2004. It has recently risen, however, 
and  will  probably  exceed  its  previous  peak  in  2005.  China 
runs a deficit in services and earnings on foreign investment. 
However, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been 
substantial. The trade surplus and FDI inflows as sources of 
foreign exchange have been augmented since 2003 by a large 
inflow of Chinese resident funds from abroad, called remittances 
and recorded in the current account surplus, but really a return 
of capital that was exported some years ago. And the errors and 
omissions in China’s balance of payments accounts, historically 
negative, turned strongly positive in 2003 and 2004, suggesting 
a further unrecorded inflow of funds. The increased remittances 
and other funds might have been drawn back to China by the 
boom conditions since 2003, particularly in real estate. They 
may also have been attracted, however, by increasing discussion, 
emanating mainly from the United States and leading to official 
US pressure on China, for a revaluation of the renminbi against 
the dollar.
The trade surplus jumped in early 2005. This was due partly 
to a slowdown in the rapid growth of imports, perhaps as the 
economy responded to the restrictive conditions the Chinese 
government introduced in 2004 to cool the boom and partly to 
a sharp growth in exports of apparel, following the expiration 
in  January  2005  of  the  30-year-old  Multi-Fiber  Agreement 
(MFA). But continued export growth occurred in many sectors, 
not just apparel. 
Here, however, we need to avoid the fallacy of concreteness. 
It is true that China’s exports of apparel jumped sharply, but 
it would be wrong to conclude that without this increase, US 
imports would not have increased and that remaining US apparel 
producers would not have felt acute competitive pressure from 
imports. The expiration of the MFA was agreed a decade ago as 
part of the Uruguay Round, with the consequential removal of 
quantitative limits on apparel imports from many developing 
countries. If imports from China had not increased, imports 
from other countries would have increased even more. To argue 
otherwise would imply that the MFA did not restrict imports 
from any country except China, which is implausible. Steps 
have recently been taken, both by the United States and the 
European Union, to restrain the growth of apparel imports from 
China—restrictions that under the rules attached to China’s 
accession to the WTO can last until 2008.
China’s foreign trade has an unusual structure, reflecting its 
growing role as a manufacturing processing center. Its exports 
of finished goods go mainly to the United States and Europe, 
and increasingly to Japan, and it runs large trade surpluses with 
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components  from  many  countries,  especially  Japan,  South 
Korea, and Southeast Asian countries, and it runs trade deficits 
with  those  countries  and  with  producers  of  raw  materials 
such as Australia. Thus its overall trade surplus is considerably 
smaller than its surpluses with Europe and the United States; 
their imports from China include content from many other 
countries,  and  the  domestic  value-added  in  exports  from 
China is unusually low. Moreover, over half of China’s exports 
originate in firms that are foreign owned or in joint ventures 
with foreign partners, so earnings of those firms accrue in large 
part to foreigners.
The Chinese economy is engaged in a deeper process than 
simply  becoming  the  world’s  manufacturer  and  assembler 
of low-skill labor-intensive goods. It is moving people out of 
agriculture, which still employs half the labor force, into more 
productive  economic  activities,  in  manufacturing,  services, 
and construction. At the core, this is what development and 
the reduction of poverty in poor countries is all about: moving 
people  out  of  agriculture  into  more  productive  economic 
activities. China’s agricultural workers dropped from over 70 
to 50 percent of the labor force over the past 25 years. Labor is 
being shed not only by agriculture but also, since the late 1990s, 
by the historically overstaffed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
These  desirable  developments  have  no  doubt  been 
facilitated—indeed,  even  made  possible—by  strong  export 
performance over the past quarter century and by hospitability 
to FDI that some other poor countries, most notably India, 
have lacked. But it would be wrong to label China’s policy 
“mercantilist.” This label implies not only export promotion but 
also hostility to imports. Yet China’s imports, like China’s exports, 
have grown enormously—from under $10 billion in 1979 to 
over $560 billion in 2004—partly as the content of growing 
exports, noted above, but also for domestic consumption and 
investment. China’s ratio of imports to GDP in 2004 reached 
34 percent, much higher than that of the United States and 
the European Union (excluding intra-European trade), not to 
mention Japan, Brazil, or India.
China’s economic performance over the past two decades 
has been nothing less than spectacular, with a drop in poverty, 
per China’s official definition, from 250 million persons in 1978 
to 22 million in 2000. This is the core of economic development 
in poor countries: moving people from near destitution to a 
condition where they have real choices.
China’s development benefits not only Chinese but also 
the rest of the world. Increased production in China makes 
available many labor-intensive goods, such as clothing and toys, 
more cheaply than would otherwise be available, thus improving 
living standards elsewhere, particularly of those who are relatively 
poor since Chinese products so far have concentrated in the low 
end of the market in many categories, including such “hi-tech” 
products as television sets and DVD players. China’s growing 
prosperity also creates new demand for production in the rest 
of world; as we have seen, China’s imports grew by more than 
half a trillion dollars since 1980, compared with a total growth 
of imports into the United States, a much richer country, of 
$1 trillion over the same period. Thus, China has contributed 
significantly to the growth in world trade and to the productive 
division of labor that growing trade both reflects and makes 
possible.
It is difficult to see who is hurt by this process, except 
perhaps those in direct competition with China for the provision 
of low-skill, labor-intensive goods. It could include persons in 
other  poor  countries  that  were  actually  taking  advantage  of 
the production and trading possibilities (many were not), and 
some US apparel workers, although as noted above, if increased 
apparel  imports  from  China  are  restricted,  they  will  almost 
certainly come from somewhere else.
Two arguments have been advanced for revaluation of the 
renminbi. First, it will reduce global imbalances. Second, it will 
help dampen the overheated Chinese economy.
The issue of global imbalances has been addressed above, 
where it is argued that they have been interpreted incorrectly 
and therefore pose a less acute problem than some analysts 
have argued. Even if China revalued the renminbi enough to 
eliminate its current account surplus altogether, and if all that 
change (implausibly) accrued to the United States, it would 
reduce the US current account deficit by only 10 percent. While 
China’s overall surplus is significant, it is small relative to the US 
deficit. In practice, elimination of China’s surplus would not all 
accrue to the United States. For the reasons elaborated above, it 
would accrue significantly to other countries, and indeed none 
of it might accrue to the United States.
Some  advocates  of  renminbi  revaluation  acknowledge 
the small contribution of the reduction of China’s surplus to 
the reduction of the US deficit, but they go on to point out 
that  it  would  permit  other,  mainly  east  Asian,  countries  to 
appreciate their currencies as well, thus enlarging the potential 
impact on the US deficit. But which countries exactly would 
welcome an appreciation of their currencies, even contingent 
on a revaluation of the renminbi? Apart from Japan, discussed 
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above, the Asian economies with relatively large current account 
surpluses are Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and Malaysia, in order of magnitude. Other countries, such 
as Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, all have such small 
surpluses, sometimes combined with trade deficits, that it is 
difficult to imagine their enthusiasm for currency appreciation. 
They could of course move into current account deficit, but 
the memories of the Asian financial crises of 1997–98 are still 
fresh enough to counsel caution in this regard, and they would 
welcome the improvement in relative competitiveness for some 
of their industries that a renminbi revaluation would bring. 
The Korean won has already appreciated by 15 percent in 
the past year, enough to worry many Koreans about their export 
performance and their economy. Hong Kong, the Philippines, 
and  Thailand  run  deficits  in  their  merchandise  trade.  The 
demographic  developments  in  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan are similar to those in Japan, lagged 
somewhat, leading them to run current account surpluses for 
the sake of themselves in old age and of future generations. 
This leaves only Malaysia and possibly Singapore (with its huge 
surplus) with large enough trade and current account surpluse 
to be comfortable in following China in a currency appreciation. 
Their current account surpluses together were running around 
$45 billion in early 2005, a modest contribution to reducing 
the US deficit even if all or most of it accrued to the United 
States.
With regard to the second reason for renminbi appreciation, 
contributing to a dampening of the overheated economy, several 
comments can be made. In the eyes of Chinese authorities, the 
overheating is sector-specific and, in particular, concentrated 
in  construction  and  the  industries  supporting  construction, 
such as steel, cement, and aluminum. The real estate market 
has been “frothy,” to borrow a US term, especially in Shanghai 
and several other large cities, with signs of speculation in new 
residences. The government has used various instruments, both 
general and selective, to dampen the boom, including central 
bank  “guidance”  to  the  commercial  banks  regarding  loans 
to  the  selected  sectors,  selective  credit  controls,  increases  in 
lending rates, and increased taxes on real estate turnover, plus 
the automatic fiscal restraint brought about by a rapid increase 
in tax revenues. The measures collectively have had an impact, 
and  indeed  real  estate  prices  in  Shanghai,  Guangzhou,  and 
some other cities have not only stopped rising but have fallen 
somewhat. Overall inflation has dropped from its high of over 
5 percent in mid-2004 to below 2 percent in the second quarter 
of 2005. 
The  dilemma  faced  by  Chinese  authorities  is  that  they 
want to cool an overheated economy, and reverse the rise in 
inflation, without generating even more distress in the urban 
labor  market,  with  its  potential  for  political  unrest,  than  is 
already occurring with continuing layoffs from SOEs. Since 
construction  is  a  major  employer  of  unskilled  labor,  the 
authorities want to reduce overbuilding without a significant 
reduction in building!
It  is  difficult  to  see  what  significant  contribution  a 
revaluation of the renminbi would make to these objectives. The 
main impact would be on foreign trade, especially the export 
sector.  A  small  revaluation—and  all  deliberate  revaluations 
in  the  past  50  years  have  been  small,  rarely  exceeding  10 
percent—would be unlikely to have a major economic impact. 
Rather, it might have the perverse effect of stimulating greater 
speculative capital inflow into China, and its neighbors, once 
the Chinese government accepted the principle of revaluation 
but at an amount deemed too low by the “market.” A large 
revaluation, say 25 percent, might satisfy market expectations 
but could do serious damage to the development process that 
China has cultivated so successfully, slowing significantly both 
growth and the reduction of poverty. Furthermore, it would 
undoubtedly  stimulate  large  speculative  inflows  into  many 
other  Asian  countries,  at  a  minimum  greatly  complicating 
macroeconomic management of those economies, as we saw in 
precrisis Mexico in 1992–93 and in Thailand in 1995–96, and 
perhaps precipitating financial crises in those countries as the 
funds were withdrawn. 
Renminbi revaluation is thus a high-risk strategy, with very 
limited gains.
Of course, if China’s trade surplus continues to grow, as 
it has done so far in 2005, these arguments would need to be 
reviewed. But historically, import growth has kept pace with 
export growth, and as noted below, China’s authorities could 
relax  further  their  current  restraints  on  imports.  Thus,  the 
Chinese  authorities  are  not  obviously  wrong  to  wait  awhile 
before significantly revaluing the renminbi.
All of this discussion is predicated on an assumption that 
the  renminbi  is  “undervalued,”  and  that  a  revaluation  is  in 
order, even though it entails certain risks. But what exactly does 
it mean to say that a currency is “undervalued?” This brief is not 
the place for a lengthy discussion of this complicated topic. The 
main evidence supporting the claim is that the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC), China’s central bank, has been intervening heavily 
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and one-sidedly for several years in the foreign exchange market 
(indeed, in practice the PBC has made the foreign exchange 
market) and has built up large foreign exchange reserves, which 
are invested heavily in dollar-dominated securities. But it should 
be remembered that China maintains controls on capital flows 
into and especially out of China. Chinese citizens are not free 
to invest abroad as Americans or the citizens of all other rich 
countries are; and Chinese firms require case-by-case permission 
to invest abroad.
China is a country with unusually high saving rates and 
unusually limited opportunities for financial investment. Most 
savings are channeled into the banking system and a limited 
amount into government bonds, both at low interest rates of 
2 to 3 percent. If the Chinese were permitted to invest abroad, 
there is little doubt that many of them would do so, particularly 
after  the  institutional  developments  required  to  make  such 
investment  easy,  such  as  the  formation  of  mutual  funds  of 
foreign securities and brokerage houses to sell them.
We do not complain of Germany’s large current account 
surplus,  because  it  is  offset  by  private  German  investment 
abroad—heavily  in  central  and  southern  Europe  but  more 
generally around the world, including in the United States. 
If  China’s  smaller  surplus  were  offset  by  private  Chinese 
investment, there would be fewer complaints about it too, and 
fewer pressures to revalue the renminbi. Indeed, it is conceivable 
that if the renminbi were a floating currency, and the capital 
controls were removed, the renminbi would depreciate under 
the  pressure  of  capital  exports  rather  than  appreciate.  This 
possibility  should  warn  us  against  casual  use  of  terms  like 
“undervaluation.”
There are good reasons China does not remove its capital 
controls  and  move  to  a  fully  convertible  currency  quickly. 
China’s domestic financial system is still in an early stage of 
development, relying (as most poor countries do) excessively 
on  its  banking  system  for  financial  intermediation;  and  its 
banking system is in a fragile state due to undercapitalization 
and too many nonperforming loans, the result of poor lending 
practices. These weaknesses are being corrected, but the changes 
required,  including  institution  building  and  development 
of  a  more  commercial  culture  among  the  employees  of  the 
financial system, will take time. Opening too rapidly to foreign 
investment could lead to a significant withdrawal of deposits 
from the banking system and precipitate a banking crisis, which 
would not be good for China’s development.
One way of interpreting the PBC’s behavior is that it is 
undertaking  the  foreign  investments  that  residents  are  not 
allowed to undertake, in anticipation of the day when controls 
on capital outflows will be removed and the Chinese will invest 
extensively abroad. In other words, the PBC is playing the role of 
financial intermediary in a globalized world financial economy 
on  behalf  of  China’s  citizens.  The  ratio  of  foreign  assets  to 
domestic credit in China’s financial system at the end of 2004, 
including the PBC, was one to four, which is not wildly out of 
line in a global financial market.   
The level of reserves is now much higher than that required 
on prudential grounds, even on a conservative interpretation of 
prudence. Thus the Chinese government might consider—as 
Singapore, Norway, and a number of oil-exporting countries 
did long ago—dividing its reserves into a liquid component, for 
foreign exchange management, and an investment component, 
which  could  be  placed  in  higher-yield,  less-liquid  portfolio 
investments abroad.
The United States has unwisely created an environment in 
which the expectation of renminbi revaluation is widespread, 
and indeed it has become an issue, again unwisely, embraced 
by some members of Congress. Thus, China faces the question, 
with  the  US  administration,  of  how  to  manage  this  issue 
smoothly, to create as little damage as possible. I suggest China 
respond with a three-part package, which does not involve the 
risky step of significantly revaluing the renminbi.
First, it should move with as much speed as such institution-
building  permits  to  build  a  functioning  foreign  exchange 
market, made by financial institutions rather than the central 
bank. Some steps have already been taken in this direction, 
but it will also involve creation of some significant difference 
between buying and selling rates for dollars by the PBC. The 
PBC’s July 21 move to introduce a basket of currencies as a 
reference point and to allow intraday variation of the dollar rate, 
albeit with a maximum change of 0.3 percent a day, is a step in 
this direction.
Second,  to  help  reduce  the  trade  surplus,  China  could 
reduce  some  of  its  import  tariffs  and  other  remaining 
restrictions on imports at a pace faster and further than the 
reductions required (by the end of 2006) by China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization. China’s import restrictions 
are  modest  compared  with  those  of  many  other  developing 
countries, but they are notably higher than those of the United 
States and Europe (except for some agricultural products), and 
they could usefully be reduced. The world is now engaged in the 
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and no country 
The United States has unwisely created 
an environment in which the expectation 
of renminbi revaluation is widespread.N u m b e r   Pb0 5 - 3     N O Ve m b e r    2 0 0 5
10
wants to jeopardize its bargaining position in such negotiations. 
However, there is ample precedent for giving China “credit” 
in  the  Doha  Round  for  any  tariff  reductions  it  undertakes 
unilaterally before the round and its subsequent 8 to 10 year 
transition period are completed.
Third, China should take steps to relax controls on the 
outward movement of capital, consistent with continuing steps 
to strengthen the domestic financial system. One natural way 
to do this, which seems to be happening, is to be less stringent 
in giving approval to Chinese firms that want to invest abroad. 
Such FDI involves management control, or at least participation 
in management. China should also encourage passive portfolio 
investment  abroad.  This  could  start  by  permitting  Chinese 
financial institutions such as insurance companies to invest a 
certain  fraction  of  their  portfolios  abroad.  Permission  could 
then be extended to selling mutual funds of foreign securities, 
stocks, and bonds to Chinese residents, perhaps with initial 
restrictions, to be relaxed gradually, on the amount that could 
be sold.
All this would be preparatory to China’s eventual move to 
its stated objective—to have full currency convertibility, with 
greater exchange rate flexibility, some time in the future.
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